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CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PRETAMENESS AND THE ORD-CC
PETER HOLY, REGULA KRAPF, AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
Abstract. It is well known that pretameness implies the forcing theorem, and that pretameness
is characterized by the preservation of the axioms of ZF−, that is ZF without the power set
axiom, or equivalently, by the preservation of the axiom scheme of replacement, for class forcing
over models of ZF. We show that pretameness in fact has various other characterizations, for
instance in terms of the forcing theorem, the preservation of the axiom scheme of separation, the
forcing equivalence of partial orders and their dense suborders, and the existence of nice names
for sets of ordinals. These results show that pretameness is a strong dividing line between well
and badly behaved notions of class forcing, and that it is exactly the right notion to consider
in applications of class forcing. Furthermore, for most properties under consideration, we also
present a corresponding characterization of the Ord-chain condition.
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the question which properties of set forcing carry over to the context
of class forcing, in particular for pretame notions of class forcing, and for notions of class forcing
with the Ord-chain condition. We show that the properties mentioned in the abstract hold for all
pretame notions of class forcing, and that they can in fact be used to characterize pretameness
and the Ord-chain condition in various ways. A list of the main results of this paper can be found
at the end of this section. In order to properly state them, we will need to introduce our setup
together with some basic notation. This is mostly the same as in [HKL+16].
We will work with transitive second-order models of set theory, that is models of the form
M = 〈M, C〉, where M is transitive and denotes the collection of sets of M and C denotes the
collection of classes of M.1 We require that M ⊆ C and that elements of C are subsets of M , and
we call elements of C\M proper classes (ofM). Classical transitive first-order models of set theory
are covered by our approach when we let C be the collection of classes definable over 〈M,∈〉. The
theories that we will be working in will be fragments of Kelley-Morse set theory KM, and mostly
we will work within fragments of Go¨del-Bernays set theory GB. By GB− we denote GB without
the power set axiom (but with Collection rather than Replacement), and by GBC we denote GB
together with the axiom of global choice.2 By a countable transitive model of some second-order
theory, we mean a transitive second-order model M = 〈M, C〉 of such a theory with both M and C
countable in V. Most of the time, we will avoid using the power set axiom, however we will often
make use of the following consequence of GB:
Definition 1.1. AmodelM = 〈M, C〉 of GB− has a hierarchy if there is C ∈ C with C ⊆ OrdM×M
such that for α ∈ OrdM
(1) Cα = {x | ∃β < α 〈β, x〉 ∈ C} ∈M ;
(2) M =
⋃
α∈OrdM Cα.
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If C is a hierarchy on M , then the C-rank of x ∈M , denoted rnkC(x), is the least α ∈ Ord
M such
that x ∈ Cα+1.
Remark 1.2. (1) Assume that M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−. Suppose that C contains a well-order ≺ of
M which is set-like, i.e. for every x ∈ M , Cx = {y ∈M | y ≺ x} ∈ M . Then the order-type
of 〈M,≺〉 is OrdM and C = {〈x, y〉 | x ∈ OrdM ∧ y ≺ x} witnesses that M has a hierarchy.
Conversely, it is easy to check that every well-order of M in C that has order-type OrdM is
set-like.
(2) If M |= GB− has a hierarchy and C contains a well-order of M , then C contains a set-like
well-order of M . To see this, let C ∈ C be a hierarchy on M and let ≺∈ C be a well-order
of M . Then we obtain a set-like well-order ⊳ of M by stipulating that x ⊳ y if and only if
rnkC(x) < rnkC(y), or rnkC(x) = rnkC(y) and x ≺ y.
(3) Without a hierarchy, the existence of a well-order of M in C does not imply that C contains
a well-order of M of order-type OrdM . This can be seen as follows. Let N be a countable
transitive model of ZFC in which CH fails and such that there is a definable wellorder of
H(ω1); assuming the existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC, such a model exists
by [Har77]. Let M = H(ω1)
N and let C be the collection of subsets of M that are definable
over M . It follows that 〈M, C〉 |= GB− and that C contains a well-order of M . Since CH fails
in N , C however cannot contain a well-order of M of order-type OrdM .
(4) If M |= GB− has a hierarchy, then it satisfies representatives choice, i.e. if for every equiv-
alence relation E ∈ C there is A ∈ C and a surjective map π : dom(E) → A in C such that
〈x, y〉 ∈ E if and only if π(x) = π(y). Assuming the presence of a hierarchy, we will thus
sometimes cite results from [HKL+16] that assume representatives choice, without further
mention.
We define GBC− to be the theory consisting of the axioms of GB− together with the axiom
postulating the existence of a set-like well-order. Note that by Remark 1.2, (3), this theory is
strictly stronger than GB−+ global choice.
Fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. By a notion of class forcing (for M) we
mean a separative partial order P = 〈P,≤P〉 such that P,≤P ∈ C.3 We will frequently identify P
with its domain P . In the following, we also fix a notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M. Note
that the assumption of separativity does not restrict us much, since if M satisfies representatives
choice, one can always pass from a notion of class forcing to its separative quotient (see [HKL+16]).
We call σ a P-name if all elements of σ are of the form 〈τ, p〉, where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P.
Define MP to be the set of all P-names that are elements of M and define CP to be the set of all
P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of MP simply
P-names and we will call the elements of CP class P-names. If σ ∈MP is a P-name, we define
rankσ = sup{rank τ + 1 | ∃p ∈ P 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}
to be its name rank. We will sometimes also need to use the usual set theoretic rank of some
σ ∈M , which we will denote as rnk(σ).
We say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset of P that is an
element of C. Given such a filter G and a P-name σ, we recursively define the G-evaluation of σ
as
σG = {τG | ∃p ∈ G 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ},
and similarly we define ΓG for Γ ∈ CP. Moreover, if G is P-generic over M, then we set M [G] =
{σG | σ ∈MP} and C[G] = {ΓG | Γ ∈ CP}. We call M[G] = 〈M [G], C[G]〉 a P-generic extension of
M.
Given an L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, ~Γ), where ~Γ ∈ (CP)n are class name parameters, p ∈ P
and ~σ ∈ (MP)m, we write p MP ϕ(~σ,
~Γ) if for every P-generic filter G over M with p ∈ G,
〈M [G],ΓG0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1〉 |= ϕ(σ
G
0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1,Γ
G
0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1).
A fundamental result in the context of set forcing is the forcing theorem. It consists of two parts,
the first one of which, the so-called definability lemma, states that the forcing relation is definable
3Note that this differs from the definition of notions of class forcing in [HKL+16], where we do not make the
assumption of separativity (and in [HKL+16], we also do not assume antisymmetry, i.e. we allow for the more
general notion of a preorder).
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PRETAMENESS AND THE ORD-CC 3
in the ground model, and the second part, denoted as the truth lemma, says that every formula
which is true in a generic extension M [G] is forced by some condition in the generic filter G. In
the context of second-order models of set theory, this has the following natural generalization:
Definition 1.3. Let ϕ ≡ ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, ~Γ) be an L∈-formula with class name parameters ~Γ ∈
(CP)n.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σm−1〉 ∈ P × (M
P)m | p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1, ~Γ)} ∈ C.
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈ MP, and
every filter G which is P-generic over M with
M[G] |= ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1,Γ
G
0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1),
there is p ∈ G with p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1,
~Γ).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability
lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M. We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem if
P satisfies the forcing theorem for all first order formulas over M.
We will frequently make use of the following observation.
Observation 1.4. If P is a notion of class forcing for M that satisfies the forcing theorem, then
every class which is first-order definable over M[G] is an element of C[G].
Proof. Let ϕ(v, x, ~C) be a first-order formula with parameter x ∈ M [G] and class parameters
~C ∈ (C[G])n. Let σ in MP be a name for x, let ~Γ ∈ (CP)n be class names for the elements of ~C.
Let Γ = {〈µ, p〉 | p P ϕ(µ, σ, ~Γ)} ∈ C. The claim follows, as in M [G], ΓG = {y | ϕ(y, x, ~C)}. 
We identify sequences of the form 〈Ci | i ∈ I〉 for classes Ci ∈ C and I ∈ C with their code
{〈c, i〉 | c ∈ Ci ∧ i ∈ I}. In particular, we say that such a sequence is an element of C if its code
is.
Note that by [HKL+16, Theorem 1.3], the forcing theorem can fail in class forcing; in fact, even
the truth lemma may fail for atomic formulae (see [HKL+16, Theorem 1.5]). There are, however,
many known properties of class forcing notions which guarantee that the forcing theorem holds
(see for example [Zar73], [Sta84], [Fri00] and [HKL+16]). The most prominent such property is
that of pretameness. The term pretameness was first used by Sy Friedman ([Fri00]), however
the concept already appears in unpublished work of Maurice Stanley ([Sta]), under the name of
predensity reduction, and is implicit in the work of Andrzej Zarach ([Zar73]), in his concept of
C-3-genericity, and the similar weak antichain property appears in [Sta84].
Definition 1.5. A notion of (class) forcing P for M is pretame for M |= GB− if for every p ∈ P
and for every sequence of dense subclasses 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C of P with I ∈ M , there is q ≤P p and
〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈M such that for every i ∈ I, di ⊆ Di and di is predense below q.
It was first shown by Stanley in his PhD thesis ([Sta84]) that pretame notions of class forcing
satisfy the forcing theorem over any model of ZF−. A much more well-known account, however
over the stronger base theory ZF, was published by Friedman as [Fri00, Theorem 2.18].4 For these
reasons, and for the benefit of the reader, we will provide a proof of this result in a generalized
setting at the beginning of Section 2, which we independently discovered before learning about
Stanley’s results, and which turned out to essentially follow the line of argument in a version of
his proof in the unpublished [Sta]. Furthermore, we will show that in a certain sense, pretameness
can in fact be characterized by the forcing theorem.
If M |= X ⊆ KM, we say that a notion of class forcing P for M preserves X if M[G] |= X for
every P-generic filterG overM. Stanley observed ([Sta84],[Sta]) that pretameness characterizes the
preservation of ZF− over models of ZF. We will provide an easy generalization of these arguments
to the context of second-order models of set theory in Section 3.
4It is in fact easy to observe that ZF can be replaced by ZF− together with the existence of a hierarchy for the
arguments of that proof to go through.
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Definition 1.6. We say that a notion of class forcing P satisfies the Ord-chain condition (or
simply Ord-cc) over M if every antichain of P which is in C is already in M .
Note that if M |= GBC−, then for notions of class forcing for M, the Ord-cc is strictly stronger
than pretameness. On the other hand, over any model of GB− + AC with a hierarchy that does
not satisfy global choice, there is a non-pretame notion of class forcing which satisfies the Ord-cc
(see [Kra16, Lemma 4.1.7]).
A property that is closely related to the forcing theorem, and that can be used to characterize
pretameness and the Ord-cc, is the existence of a Boolean completion. We distinguish between
two types of Boolean completions, depending on whether suprema exist for all sets or for all classes
of conditions.
Definition 1.7. If B is a Boolean algebra, then B is
(1) M -complete if the supremum supBA exists in B for every A ∈M with A ⊆ B.
(2) C-complete if the supremum supBA exists in B for every A ∈ C with A ⊆ B.
Definition 1.8. We say that P has a Boolean M -completion in M if there is an M -complete
Boolean B = 〈B, 0B, 1B ¬,∧,∨〉 such that B, all Boolean operations of B and an injective dense
embedding from P into B \ {0B} are elements of C. Similarly, we define a Boolean C-completion of
P to be a Boolean M -completion B of P which additionally is C-complete.
In set forcing, Boolean completions are unique: If B0 and B1 are both Boolean completions of
P and e0 : P → B0 and e1 : P → B1 are dense embeddings, then one can define an isomorphism
from B0 to B1 by setting f(b) = sup{e1(p) | p ∈ P ∧ e0(p) ≤ b} for b ∈ B0. Moreover, f fixes P in
the sense that f(e0(p)) = e1(p) for every condition p ∈ P. In class forcing, this proof works only
for Boolean C-completions (provided that they exist). It follows from results in [HKL+16, Section
9] that Boolean M -completions need not be unique in the following sense.
Definition 1.9. We say that a notion of class forcing P has a unique Boolean M -completion in
M, if P has a Boolean M -completion B0 in M and for every other Boolean M -completion B1 of P
in M there is an isomorphism in V between B0 and B1 which fixes P. The property that P has a
unique Boolean C-completion is defined correspondingly.
In Section 4, we will investigate the relationship between the existence of Boolean completions
on the one hand, and pretameness and the Ord-cc on the other.
A technique that we will use in many places throughout this paper is adding suprema of
proper subclasses of conditions to class forcing notions P. We will make use of the following
characterization of suprema: For a class A ∈ C with A ⊆ P, we say that p ∈ P is the supremum of
A (denoted p = supPA) if and only if
(1) ∀a ∈ A a ≤P p and
(2) A is predense below p.
It is easy to check that this corresponds to the usual definition of suprema as least upper bounds.
We now describe a general method of how to extend a notion of class forcing P by adding
suprema. Let S = 〈Xi | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈ M be a sequence of subclasses of P. Making use of
a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that P ∩ I = ∅. Now let PS be the forcing notion with
domain PS = P ∪ I ordered by
i ≤PS p⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Xi q ≤P p,
p ≤PS i⇐⇒ Xi is predense below p in P,
i ≤PS j ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Xi q ≤PS j.
For i ∈ I, we will usually write supXi rather than i. In case that supXi already exists in P, or
that supXi ≤PS supXj and supXj ≤PS supXi for some i 6= j, instead of PS we need to consider
the quotient of PS by the equivalence relation p ∼ q iff p ≤PS q and q ≤PS p for p, q ∈ P ∪ I,
in order to obtain a separative partial order. Since I ∈ M and P is separative, all equivalence
classes are set-sized, hence this can easily be done, and we will identify PS with this quotient in
this case. We call PS the forcing notion obtained from P by adding supXi for all i ∈ I. Note that
by construction, P is dense in PS .
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Lemma 1.10. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem. If
S ∈ C is a finite sequence of subclasses of P, then PS satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. This is an easy generalization of [HKL+16, Lemma 9.3]. 
It will follow from the proof of Theorem 2.9 that this may fail for infinite sequences of subclasses
of P.
Example 1.11. We will frequently use the following notion of class forcing to motivate our results.
Given M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−, let Col(ω,Ord)M denote the notion of class forcing with conditions
of the form p : dom(p) → OrdM for dom(p) ⊆ ω finite, ordered by reverse inclusion. It follows
from [HKL+16, Lemma 2.2, Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.4] that Col(ω,Ord)M satisfies the forcing
theorem. However, Col(ω,Ord)M is non-pretame as witnessed by the sequence 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉,
where Dn is the dense class of all conditions p such that n ∈ dom(p). Another way to see this is
to observe that any Col(ω,Ord)M -generic filter gives rise to a cofinal sequence from ω to OrdM ,
and thus induces a failure of Replacement in the generic extension (see Section 3).
Results.
Notation. LetM |= GB− and let Ψ be some property of a notion of class forcing P forM = 〈M, C〉.
We say that P densely satisfies Ψ if every notion of class forcing Q for M, for which there is a
dense embedding in C from P into Q, satisfies the property Ψ.
For the sake of simplicity, if there is a dense embedding in C from P into Q, we will frequently
assume that P is a suborder of Q. This does not constitute a restriction, since in the above
situation, P is always isomorphic to a (dense) suborder of Q.
The following two theorems summarize the results of the present paper. Regarding Theorem
1.12 below, in a slightly less general context, that pretameness implies both (1) and (2) and that
(1) implies pretameness is due to Maurice Stanley ([Sta84],[Sta]), and the equivalence of (4) and
(5) is an immediate consequence of [HKL+16, Theorem 5.5].
Theorem 1.12. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GBC−, and let P be a notion
of class forcing for M. The following properties (over M) are equivalent to the pretameness of P
over M, where we additionally require the non-existence of a first-order truth predicate for (4) and
(5), and for (7) we assume that M |= KM, which is notably incompatible to the assumptions used
for (4) and (5).
(1) P preserves GB−/Collection/Replacement.
(2) P satisfies the forcing theorem and preserves Separation.
(3) P satisfies the forcing theorem and does not add a cofinal/surjective function from some
γ ∈ OrdM to OrdM .
(4) P densely satisfies the forcing theorem.
(5) P densely has a Boolean M -completion.
(6) P satisfies the forcing theorem and produces the same generic extensions as Q for every
forcing notion Q such that C contains a dense embedding from P into Q.5
(7) P densely has the property that every set of ordinals in any of its generic extensions has a
nice name.
Given notions of class forcing P and Q for M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−, given π ∈ C such that π is a
dense embedding from P to Q, and given a P-name σ, we recursively define π(σ) = {〈π(τ), π(p)〉 |
〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
Theorem 1.13. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− such that M |= GBC−,
and let P be a notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem. The following properties
(over M) are equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the Ord-cc.
(2) P satisfies the maximality principle.6
(3) P densely has a unique Boolean M -completion.
(4) P has a Boolean C-completion.
5More precisely, if pi : P→ Q in C is a dense embedding and H is Q-generic over M, then M [pi−1[H]] =M [H].
6See Definition 2.12.
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(5) If there are Q, π ∈ C such that π is a dense embedding from P to Q and σ ∈MQ, then there
is τ ∈MP with 1Q Q σ = π(τ).
(6) P densely has the property that whenever 1P P σ ⊆ αˇ for some σ ∈ MP and α ∈ Ord
M ,
then there is a nice P-name τ such that 1P P σ = τ .
Whether pretameness implies Statement (6) of Theorem 1.12 was a question (that turned out
to have an easy positive answer) posed to us by Victoria Gitman at the European Set Theory
Workshop in Cambridge in the summer of 2015, and was one of the starting points of the research
that we present in this paper.
2. The forcing theorem
In this section, we characterize pretameness in terms of the forcing theorem. Our first goal will
be to verify that pretame notions of class forcing satisfy the forcing theorem. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be
a fixed countable transitive model of GB−.
Definition 2.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M and let p, q ∈ P.
(1) If p and q are compatible in P, we say that D ⊆ P is dense below p ∧ q if ∀r ≤P p, q ∃s ≤P
r (s ∈ D).7
(2) We say that d ⊆ P is predense below p ∧ q if ∀r ≤P p, q ∃s ∈ d (r ‖P s).
Moreover, if p ⊥P q, we make the additional convention that only the empty set is predense below
p ∧ q, while any set is dense below p ∧ q.8
We will make use of the following equivalent formulation of pretameness:
Remark 2.2. A notion of class forcing P is pretame for M if and only if for every p ∈ P and for all
sequences 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C and 〈si | i ∈ I〉 ∈M such that each Di is dense below p ∧ si, there are
q ≤P p and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈M such that each di ⊆ Di is predense below q ∧ si.
Let us fix some notion of class forcing P for M. By [HKL+16, Theorem 4.3], in order to verify
the forcing theorem for P, it suffices to check that the forcing relation for some atomic L∈-formula
is definable over M. Let σ and τ be P-names in M, and let p ∈ P be a condition. In set forcing,
one may define the syntactic forcing relation ∗P for atomic formulae recursively, by stipulating
the following (essentially as in [Kun80, Chapter VII, Definition 3.3]).
(A) p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if the following property (a) holds: for all 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ,
{q | q ∗P ρ ∈ τ} is dense below p ∧ s in P.
(=) p ∗P σ = τ if and only if p 
∗
P σ ⊆ τ and p 
∗
P τ ⊆ σ.
(B) p ∗P σ ∈ τ if and only if the following property (b) holds:
{q | ∃〈ρ, s〉 ∈ τ [q ≤P s ∧ q 
∗
P σ = ρ]} is dense below p in P.
To verify the definability of the semantic forcing relation P=
M
P for atomic formulae in the
classical case of set forcing, one then proceeds to show that the relation ∗P, which in the case of
set forcing is easily seen to be a definable relation, concides with P. Such string of arguments
may be found in [Kun80, Chapter VII, §3], leading up to its [Kun80, Chapter VII, Theorem 3.6].
Provided that we have a class relation ∗P that satisfies Properties (A), (=) and (B) w.r.t. a notion
of class forcing P, it is easy to observe that exactly the same arguments yield that ∗P=P for
atomic formulae. That is, classical arguments yield the following.
Lemma 2.3. Assume that P is a notion of class forcing for a countable transitive model M =
〈M, C〉 |= GB−, and assume that ∗P ⊆ P ×M
P × {⊆,∈} ×MP is a relation in C. If ∗P satisfies
Properties (A), (=) and (B), then ∗P coincides with the semantic forcing relation P for atomic
formulae in the forcing language of P over M. 
We are now ready to provide a proof of the following theorem.
7We do not assume that P is closed under meets; p ∧ q is merely a symbol here and in the following, and is not
supposed to denote the actual meet of p and q in P, which may not exist.
8While this may at first seem like a somewhat weird convention, it will save us a lot of notational cumbersomeness
in the arguments to follow.
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Theorem 2.4 (Stanley). Let M be a countable transitive model of GB−, and let P be a notion of
class forcing for M. If P is pretame over M, then P satisfies the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. We will show that we can define a class ∗P within M that satisfies properties (A), (=)
and (B). We will not bother with defining ∗P w.r.t. equality, considering its instances as mere
abbreviations for two statements concerning the ⊆-relation.
However, we will need to first define yet another auxiliary forcing relation, that collects forcing
statements for which we have (set-sized) witnesses in M ; we may call this the witnessed forcing
relation (for atomic formulae) of M. For R ∈ {⊆,∈}, we define that p ∗∗P σRτ if there is a set
Y ⊆ P×MP×{⊆,∈}×MP in M , and a set ~D = 〈dy | y ∈ Y 〉 in M with the following properties:
(1) If y ∈ Y is of the form y = 〈q, µ,∈, ν〉, then dy is a predense subset of P below q.
(2) ∀〈q, µ,∈, ν〉 ∈ Y ∀r ∈ d〈q,µ,∈,ν〉 ∃〈ρ, s〉 ∈ ν [r ≤P s ∧ 〈r, µ,⊆, ρ〉 ∈ Y ∧ 〈r, ρ,⊆, µ〉 ∈ Y ].
(3) If y ∈ Y is of the form y = 〈q, µ,⊆, ν〉, then dy is of the form dy = 〈dρ,sy | 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ µ〉
and each dρ,sy is a predense subset of P below q ∧ s whenever q ‖P s, and the empty set
otherwise.
(4) ∀〈q, µ,⊆, ν〉 ∈ Y ∀〈ρ, s〉 ∈ µ ∀r ∈ dρ,s〈q,µ,⊆,ν〉 〈r, ρ,∈, ν〉 ∈ Y .
(5) 〈p, σ,R, τ〉 ∈ Y .
In the above, we say that Y and ~D witness that p ∗∗P σRτ . We write p 
∗∗
P σ = τ to denote the
statement that p ∗∗P σ ⊆ τ and p 
∗∗
P τ ⊆ σ. For R ∈ {⊆,∈,=}, we define that p 
∗
P σRτ if the
class {q ≤P p | q ∗∗P σRτ} is dense below p. We will verify that 
∗
P satisfies properties (A), (=)
and (B), thus finishing the proof of the theorem. We start with three easy claims.
Definition 2.5. Given a P-name σ, we define the names appearing in (the transitive closure of)
σ by induction on name rank as
tn(σ) =
⋃
{{τ} ∪ tn(τ) | ∃p 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
Claim 1. Let p ∈ P and σ, τ ∈MP. Then the following statements hold.
(i) If 〈σ, p〉 ∈ τ then p ∗∗P σ ∈ τ .
(ii) If Y, ~D witness that p ∗∗P σRτ , then for every element 〈q, µ,R
′, ν〉 ∈ Y , q ∗∗P µR
′ν.
Proof. For (i), note that
Y = {〈q, µ,∈, ν〉 | 〈µ, q〉 ∈ ν ∧ ν ∈ {τ} ∪ tn(τ)} ∪ {〈q, µ,⊆, µ〉 | 〈µ, q〉 ∈ tn(τ)}
and ~D = 〈dy | y ∈ Y 〉 with d〈q,µ,∈,ν〉 = {q} and d
ρ,s
〈q,µ,⊆,µ〉 = {s} witness that p 
∗∗
P σ ∈ τ .
Property (ii) is immediate. 
Claim 2. The following statements hold for any p ∈ P, set names σ, τ ∈MP and R ∈ {⊆,∈,=}.
(i) If p ∗∗P σRτ and q ≤P p then q 
∗∗
P σRτ .
(ii) If p ∗∗P σRτ then p 
∗
P σRτ .
(iii) If p ∗P σRτ and q ≤P p then q 
∗
P σRτ .
Proof. In order to verify Property (i), pick Y and ~D = 〈dy | y ∈ Y 〉 witnessing that p 
∗∗
P σRτ ,
and let q ≤P p. If it happens to be the case that 〈q, σ,R, τ〉 ∈ Y , then we are done by Claim 1,
(ii). Otherwise, let Z = Y ∪ {〈q, σ,R, τ〉}, and let ~E = ~D ∪ {〈〈q, σ,R, τ〉, d〈p,σ,R,τ〉〉}. Then Z and
~E witness that q ∗∗P σRτ .
(ii) is immediate from (i), and (iii) follows directly from the definition of ∗∗P . 
Claim 3. Assume that we are given a sequence 〈〈pi, σi, Ri, τi, Yi, ~Di〉 | i ∈ I〉 ∈ M such that for
every i ∈ I, Yi and ~Di = 〈(di)y | y ∈ Yi〉 witness that pi ∗∗P σiRiτi. Then there are Y and
~D,
both in M , witnessing that for every i ∈ I, pi ∗∗P σiRiτi.
Proof. Let Y =
⋃
i∈I Yi and
~D = 〈dy | y ∈ Y 〉, where
dy =
{⋃
{(di)y | i ∈ I, y ∈ Yi}, if y = 〈q, µ,∈, ν〉,
〈
⋃
{(di)ρ,sy | i ∈ I, y ∈ Yi} | 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ µ〉, if y = 〈q, µ,⊆, ν〉.
It is straightforward to verify properties (1)–(5) above in order to show that Y and ~D witness
that for every i ∈ I, pi ∗∗P σiRiτi. 
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Now we are ready to prove that the relation ∗P satisfies properties (A), (=) and (B). Let p ∈ P
be a condition and let σ, τ ∈MP set names.
Assume that p ∗P σ ⊆ τ and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ such that p ‖P s. Take q ∈ P with q ≤P p, s. By our
assumption, there is r ≤P q with r ∗∗P σ ⊆ τ . Let Y and
~D witness this. Then y = 〈r, σ,⊆, τ〉 ∈ Y
and hence dρ,sy is predense below r. Let r
′ ‖P r with r′ ∈ dρ,sy . By Property (4), 〈r
′, ρ,∈, τ〉 ∈ Y . In
particular, Claim 1 (ii) implies that r′ ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ . By Claim 2 (i), t 
∗∗
P ρ ∈ τ for every condition
t with t ≤P r, r′, proving (a).
Conversely, suppose that Property (a) holds for p, σ and τ and let q ≤P p. We need to find
r ≤P q with r ∗∗P σ ⊆ τ . By Property (a), for each 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ the class
Dρ,s = {r ≤P q | r 
∗∗
P ρ ∈ τ} ∈ C
is dense below q ∧ s. Applying pretameness in the sense of Remark 2.2, we can find r ≤P q and a
sequence 〈dρ,s | 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ〉 ∈M such that each dρ,s ⊆ Dρ,s is predense below r∧s. Using Collection
and Separation, we can find a set X ∈M such that each element of X is of the form 〈Y, ~D〉, where
Y, ~D witness that t ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ for some 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ and t ∈ d
ρ,s. Using Claim 3, we can amalgamate
the elements of X to obtain Y, ~D which witness simultaneously that t ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ for every such
t ∈ dρ,s with 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ. Now let Z = Y ∪ {〈r, σ,⊆, τ〉}, let d〈r,σ,⊆,τ〉 = 〈d
ρ,s | 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ〉, and let
~E = ~D ∪ {〈〈r, σ,⊆, τ〉, d〈r,σ,⊆,τ〉〉}. By the definition of 
∗∗
P , Z and
~E witness that r ∗∗P σ ⊆ τ .
But this means that p ∗P σ ⊆ τ , as desired.
Assume that p ∗P σ ∈ τ and let q ≤P p. By our assumption, there is r ≤P q such that
r ∗∗P σ ∈ τ . Let Y and
~D witness this. Then 〈r, σ,∈, τ〉 ∈ Y and hence d〈r,σ,∈,τ〉 is predense
below r. Let r′ ∈ d〈r,σ,∈,τ〉 be such that r
′ and r are compatible. By Property (2), there is
〈ρ, s〉 ∈ τ such that r′ ≤P s and 〈r′, σ,⊆, ρ〉, 〈r′, ρ,⊆, σ〉 ∈ Y . This means that r′ ∗∗P σ = ρ. Let
t ≤P r, r′ witness that r and r′ are compatible. Then by Claim 2, (i), t ∗∗P σ = ρ, and hence by
Claim 2, (ii), t ∗P σ = ρ. This shows that Property (b) holds.
Conversely, suppose that Property (b) holds. Then by the definition of ∗P,
D = {r ≤P p | ∃〈ρ, s〉 ∈ τ [r ≤P s ∧ r 
∗∗
P σ = ρ]} ∈ C
is a dense class of conditions below p. We claim that r ∗∗P σ ∈ τ for every r ∈ D. Pick some
condition r ∈ D, and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ τ witness that r ∈ D. By Claim 1 (i), s ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ and hence
by Claim 2 (i), r ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ . Using Claim 3, we can take Y and
~D witnessing that r ∗∗P ρ ∈ τ
and that r ∗∗P σ = ρ. Let Z = Y ∪ {r, σ,∈, τ} and
~E = ~D ∪ {〈〈r, σ,∈, τ〉, {r}〉}. Then Z and ~E
witness that r ∗∗P σ ∈ τ . But this means exactly that p 
∗
P σ ∈ τ , as desired. 
In [HKL+16, Theorem 1.3], it is shown that the forcing theorem may fail in class forcing. The
notion of forcing used to prove this adds a binary predicate E on ω so that 〈ω,E〉 isomorphic to
〈M,∈〉. The idea is that if the forcing theorem was satisfied one would obtain a first-order truth
predicate in the ground model. In this section, we will prove a density version of this theorem.
The following easy observation will be a key ingredient for our proof.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GB− with a hierarchy, and let P
be a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P is pretame if and
only if there exist no set a ∈M , F˙ ∈ CP and p ∈ P such that p P “ F˙ : aˇ→ Ord
M is cofinal”.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame, that a ∈M , and that p P “ F˙ : aˇ→ Ord
M”. Let
Dx = {q ≤P p | ∃γ ∈ Ord
M q P F˙ (xˇ) = γˇ}
for x ∈ a. By pretameness, there are q ≤P p and a sequence 〈dx | x ∈ a〉 ∈ M such that each
dx ⊆ Dx is predense below q. Let
β = sup{γ + 1 | γ ∈ OrdM ∧ ∃x ∈ a ∃r ∈ dx r P F˙ (xˇ) = γˇ} ∈ Ord
M .
Then q P ran(F˙ ) ⊆ βˇ, hence p does not force the range of F˙ to be cofinal in Ord
M .
Conversely, suppose that 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C with I ∈ M is a sequence of dense subclasses of P
and p ∈ P is such that there exist no q ≤P p and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ M with each di ⊆ Di predense
below q. Let 〈Cα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 be a hierarchy on M . Now let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G.
In M[G], let F : I → OrdM be the function defined by
F (i) = min{α ∈ OrdM | Cα ∩Di ∩G 6= ∅}
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PRETAMENESS AND THE ORD-CC 9
for i ∈ I. Using the forcing theorem and Observation 1.4, we may choose a name F˙ ∈ C for F and
a condition q ≤P p in G such that the above property of F˙ is forced by q. But then q forces that
F˙ is cofinal in the ordinals – otherwise we could strengthen q to some r which forces the range of
F˙ to be contained in some ordinal α and so di = Di ∩ Cα would be predense below r for every
i ∈ I, contradicting our assumption. 
If we additionally assume the existence of a set-like wellorder, we obtain the following strength-
ening of Lemma 2.6.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC− and that P is a
notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Assume that F˙ ∈ CP and p ∈ P
are such that p P “ F˙ : κˇ→ Ord
M is cofinal” for some M -cardinal κ. Then there is a class name
E˙ ∈ C and q ≤P p such that q P “ E˙ : κˇ→ Ord
M is surjective.”
Proof. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem,
A = {〈r, α, β〉 | ∃s ≤P r s P F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ} ∈ C.
Hence, making use of a set-like wellorder, there is a sequence C = 〈Ci | i ∈ Ord
M 〉 ∈ C such that
each Ci is of the form
Ar,α = {β ∈ Ord
M | ∃s ≤P r s P F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ}
for some r ∈ P and α ∈ OrdM such that Ar,α is a proper class, and moreover each such class Ar,α
appears unboundedly often in C.
Claim 4. There is a class D = 〈Dβ | β ∈ Ord
M 〉 such that the classes Dβ form a partition of
OrdM and Cα ∩Dβ is a proper class for all α, β ∈ Ord
M .
Proof. Let k : OrdM × OrdM → OrdM be a bijection in C such that whenever γ¯ < γ, k(β, γ¯) <
k(β, γ). Now we recursively define sets of ordinals Dγβ ∈ M in the following way: We start
with D00 = ∅. Let α, β, γ ∈ Ord
M be such that α = k(β, γ) and assume that for all β¯, γ¯ with
k(β¯, γ¯) < α, Dγ¯
β¯
has already been defined. Now let Dγβ =
⋃
γ¯<γ D
γ¯
β ∪ {δ}, where δ is the least
ordinal in Cγ \
⋃
{Dγ¯
β¯
| k(β¯, γ¯) < α}. Finally, put Dβ =
⋃
γ∈OrdM D
γ
β for each β ∈ Ord
M . By
construction, if β 6= β¯ then Dβ and Dβ¯ are disjoint. Moreover, since Cα appears unboundedly
often in the enumeration defined above, Cα ∩Dβ is a proper class for all α, β ∈ Ord
M . 
Suppose that D is a class as in the statement of the previous claim. If G is P-generic over M
with p ∈ G, let E : κ→ OrdM be the function given by E(α) = β if F˙G(α) ∈ Dβ. Since P satisfies
the forcing theorem, by Observation 1.4, there is a class name E˙ ∈ C and a condition q ∈ G below
p which forces that E˙ satisfies this definition.
Claim 5. q P “ E˙ : κˇ→ Ord
M is surjective”.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, there is a condition r ≤P q
and some ordinal β such that r P E˙(αˇ) 6= βˇ for all α < κ. Then there is α < κ such that
Ar,α = {γ ∈ Ord
M | ∃s ≤P r s P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ} is a proper class, since otherwise r forces that
the range of F˙ is bounded in OrdM , contradicting our assumption on F˙ . By the previous claim,
Ar,α ∩ Dβ is nonempty. Choose γ ∈ Ar,α ∩ Dβ and s ≤P r so that s P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Then
s P E˙(αˇ) = βˇ, contradicting our choice of r and of β. 
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.7. 
Definition 2.8. LetM be a model of ZF−. A relation T ⊆ Fml×M is a first-order truth predicate
for M if
〈pϕq, x〉 ∈ T ⇐⇒ 〈M,∈〉 |= ϕ(x)
holds for every pϕq ∈ Fml and every x ∈ M , where Fml denotes the set of Go¨del codes of
L∈-formulae with one free variable.
Using the previous lemma, we are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
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Theorem 2.9. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC− such that C
does not contain a first-order truth predicate for M .9 If P is a non-pretame notion of class forcing
for M, then there is a notion of class forcing Q for M and a dense embedding π : P→ Q in C such
that Q does not satisfy the forcing theorem.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P satisfies the forcing theorem. Using
Lemma 2.6, the axiom of choice, and Lemma 2.7, we can choose p ∈ P and a class name F˙ such
that
p P “ F˙ : κˇ→ Mˇ is surjective”
for some M -cardinal κ.
We extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema pα,β for the classes
Dα,β = {q ≤P p | q P F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ)}
for all α, β < κ such that Dα,β is nonempty. Let X = {〈α, β〉 ∈ κ2 | Dα,β 6= ∅}. The following
arguments generalize the proof of [HKL+16, Theorem 1.3]. Define
E˙ = {〈op(αˇ, βˇ), pα,β〉 | 〈α, β〉 ∈ X} ∈M
Q.
Assume for a contradiction that Q satisfies the forcing theorem. We will use E˙ to show that C
contains a first-order truth predicate for M , contradicting our assumptions.
Claim 1. Let G be Q-generic over M with p ∈ G and let E = E˙G and F = F˙G. Then in M [G]
it holds that 〈α, β〉 ∈ E if and only if M |= F (α) ∈ F (β).
Proof. Let α, β < κ such that 〈α, β〉 ∈ E. Then 〈α, β〉 ∈ X and pα,β ∈ G. But by definition of
≤Q, pα,β Q F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ) and therefore F (α) ∈ F (β) as desired. Conversely, suppose that x ∈ y
in M . Since F is surjective, there are α, β < κ such that F (α) = x and F (β) = y. Moreover,
there must be q ∈ G which forces that F˙ (αˇ) ∈ F˙ (βˇ) and so q ≤Q pα,β . In particular, pαβ ∈ G and
so 〈α, β〉 ∈ E. 
The next step will be to translate L∈-formulae into infinitary quantifier-free formulae in the
forcing language of Q, where ∈ is translated to E˙. The infinitary language LOrd,0(Q,M) is built
up from the atomic formulae qˇ ∈ G˙, σ ∈ τ and σ = τ for q ∈ Q and σ, τ ∈ MP, the negation
operator and set-sized conjunctions and disjunctions. We denote by FmlOrd,0(Q,M) the class of
Go¨del codes of LOrd,0(Q,M)-formulae.
10
Inductively, we assign to every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables in {v0, . . . , vk−1} and all ~α =
α0, . . . , αk−1 ∈ κk an LOrd,0(Q,M)-formula in the following way:
(vi = vj)
∗
~α = (αˇi = αˇj)
(vi ∈ vj)
∗
~α = (op(αˇi, αˇj) ∈ E˙)
(¬ϕ)∗~α = (¬ϕ
∗
~α)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~α = (ϕ
∗
~α ∨ ψ
∗
~α)
(∃vkϕ)
∗
~α = (
∨
β<κ
ϕ∗~α,β).
Note that, by [HKL+16, Lemma 5.2], if Q satisfies the definability lemma for either “v0 ∈ v1” or
“v0 = v1”, then it satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all LOrd,0(Q,M)-formulae, i.e.
{〈p, pϕq〉 ∈ Q× FmlOrd,0(Q,M) | p 
M
Q ϕ} ∈ C
and Q satisfies the truth lemma for every LOrd,0(Q,M)-formula ϕ over M. The following claim
will thus allow us to define a first-order truth predicate over M .
Claim 2. For every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1} and for all ~x =
x0, . . . , xk−1 in M , the following statements are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ(~x).
9Note that by Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth, every model of the form 〈M, C〉 |= GBC−, where
C only consists of the definable subsets of M , satisfies these requirements.
10A detailed description of L
Ord,0
(Q,M) is given in [HKL+16, Section 5].
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(2) ∀~α ∈ κk ∀q ≤P p
[
q P “∀i < k F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi”→ q Q ϕ∗~α
]
.
(3) ∃~α ∈ κk ∃q ≤P p
[
q P “∀i < k F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi” ∧ q Q ϕ∗~α
]
.
Proof. Observe that since p P “ F˙ : κˇ→M is surjective”, (2) always implies (3). We argue by
induction on the construction of the formula ϕ that (1) implies (2) and that (3) implies (1).
We start with the atomic formula “vi ∈ vj”. Suppose first that (1) holds, that is M |= x ∈ y.
Let ~α ∈ κk, let i, j < k, and let q ≤P p be such that q P F˙ (αˇi) = xˇ ∧ F˙ (αˇj) = yˇ. Take a
Q-generic filter with q ∈ G. Since q ≤Q pαi,αj , we have pαi,αj ∈ G. Moreover, 〈αi, αj〉 ∈ E˙
G,
so (2) holds. Assume now that (3) holds, i.e. there is ~α ∈ κk, i, j < k and q ≤P p such that
q P F˙ (αˇi) = xˇ∧ F˙ (αˇj) = yˇ and such that q Q (vi ∈ vj)∗~α. Let G be Q-generic with q ∈ G. Then
〈αi, αj〉 ∈ E˙G, and so pαi,αj ∈ G. In particular, this means that x = F˙
G(αi) ∈ F˙G(αj) = y. The
proof for “vi = vj” is similar.
Next we turn to negations. Suppose first that M |= ¬ϕ(~x) and let ~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p with
q P ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi). Assume, towards a contradiction, that q 1Q ¬ϕ∗~α. Then there is r ≤Q q
with r Q ϕ
∗
~α. By density, we may assume that r ∈ P. Then r ≤P p and so ~α and r witness (3)
for ϕ. By our inductive hypothesis we obtain that M |= ϕ(~x), a contradiction. The implication
from (3) to (1) is similar.
Suppose now that M |= (ϕ∨ψ)(~x). Without loss of generality, assume that M |= ϕ(~x). Now if
~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p with q P ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi), by induction q Q ϕ
∗
~α. But then in particular
q Q (ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~α. In order to see that (3) implies (1), suppose that ~α ∈ κ
k and q ≤P p witness (3).
Then there must be a strengthenig r ∈ Q of q which satisfies, without loss of generality, r Q ϕ∗~α.
By density of P in Q, we can assume that r ∈ P. This means that ~α and r witness that (3) holds
for ϕ, so M |= ϕ(~x).
We are left with the existential case. Assume first that M |= ∃vkϕ(~x). Take y ∈ M such that
M |= ϕ(~x, y) and let ~α ∈ κk and q ≤P p with q P ∀i < k (F˙ (αˇi) = xˇi). Let now G be Q-generic
with q ∈ G. By an easy density argument there must be r ≤P p and β < κ with r ∈ G and
r P F˙ (βˇ) = yˇ. By induction, r Q ϕ
∗
~α,β. In particular, M [G] |= (∃vkϕ)
∗
~α. The converse follows
in a similar way. 
Let Fml1 denote the set of all Go¨del codes of L∈-formulae whose only free variable is v0. As a
consequence of Claim 2, the class
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1 ∧ x ∈M ∧ ∀α < κ ∀q ≤P p q P F˙ (αˇ) = xˇ→ q Q ϕ
∗
α}
defines a first-order truth predicate for M , contradicting our assumptions on M. 
Corollary 2.10. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC− such that C
does not contain a first-order truth predicate for M . Then a notion of class forcing P for M is
pretame if and only if it densely satisfies the forcing theorem. 
Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 2.9 yields the following, with P = Col(ω,Ord)M as a witness.
Corollary 2.11. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC− such that C
does not contain a first-order truth predicate for M . Then there is a notion of class forcing P for
M which satisfies the forcing theorem, such that there is an ω-sequence S of subclasses of P, for
which PS does not satisfy the forcing theorem. 
Given a notion of class forcing P, a condition p ∈ P, and a first order formula ϕ, it is easy to
see that (as in the case of set forcing) p P ∃xϕ(x) if and only if the class of all q ≤P p such that
there is a P-name σ with q P ϕ(σ) is dense below p. The maximality principle states that it
is not necessary to strengthen p in order to obtain a witnessing name for an existential formula.
While this is a valid principle for set forcing, we observe that for notions of class forcing which
satisfy the forcing theorem, this principle is equivalent to the Ord-cc over models of GBC.
Definition 2.12. A notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem is said
to satisfy the maximality principle over M if whenever p P ∃xϕ(x, ~σ, ~Γ) for some p ∈ P, some
L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm, ~Γ) with class name parameters ~Γ ∈ (CP)n, and ~σ in (MP)m, then there
is τ ∈MP such that p P ϕ(τ, ~σ, ~Γ).
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Lemma 2.13. Assume that M is a model of GBC and let P be a notion of class forcing for M
which satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P satisfies the maximality principle if and only if it
satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the maximality principle and let A ∈ C be an antichain of
P. Since C contains a well-ordering of M , we can extend A to a maximal antichain A′ ∈ C. It is
enough to show that A′ ∈M . Clearly, 1P P ∃x (x ∈ Aˇ′ ∩ G˙). Using the maximality principle, we
obtain σ ∈MP such that 1P P σ ∈ Aˇ′ ∩ G˙. But then since rnk(σG) ≤ rnk(σ) for every P-generic
filter G, A′ ⊆ P ∩ (Vα)M for α = rnk(σ) and so A′ ∈M .
Conversely, assume that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M and let p P ∃xϕ(x, ~σ, ~Γ). Using the
global well-order in C we can find an antichain A ∈ C which is maximal in {q ≤P p | ∃σ ∈MP q P
ϕ(σ, ~σ, ~Γ)} ∈ C. Note that supA = p and that A ∈ M by assumption. For every q ∈ A, choose
a name τq ∈ MP such that q P ϕ(τq, ~σ, ~Γ). Furthermore, for every µ ∈ dom(τq), let Aqµ be a
maximal antichain in {r ≤P q | ∃s 〈µ, s〉 ∈ τq ∧ r ≤P s}. Now put
σ = {〈µ, r〉 | ∃q ∈ A µ ∈ dom(τq) ∧ r ∈ A
q
µ}.
By construction, q P σ = τq for every q ∈ A and so p P ϕ(σ). 
3. Preservation of axioms
The following theorem adapts [Fri00, Proposition 2.17 and Lemma 2.19] to our generalized
setting.
Theorem 3.1 (Stanley). Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−. Then the
following statements hold for every notion of class forcing P for M.
(1) If P is pretame and G is P-generic over M, then M[G] satisfies GB−. Moreover, if M is a
model of GBC−, then so is M[G], and if M has a hierarchy, then so does M[G].
(2) Suppose that M has a hierarchy, and that for every P-generic filter G, either Replacement
or Collection holds in M[G]. Then P is pretame.
Proof. For (1), suppose that P is pretame and that G is P-generic over M. Note that by Theorem
2.4, P satisfies the forcing theorem. It is easy to check that M[G] satisfies all set axioms of
GB− except possibly for Separation, Collection and Union. Moreover, Collection together with
Separation implies Replacement, and the preservation of Separation can easily be seen to imply
the preservation of Union.
To see that M[G] satisfies Collection, assume that M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σG ∃y ϕ(x, y,ΓG), where
σ ∈ MP, Γ ∈ CP and ϕ is an L∈-formula with one class parameter. By the truth lemma there is
p ∈ G such that p P ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ϕ(x, y,Γ). For each 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ, the class
Dπ,r = {s ∈ P | [s ≤P p, r ∧ ∃µ ∈M
P (s P ϕ(π, µ,Γ))] ∨ s⊥Pr} ∈ C
is dense below p in P. By pretameness there is q ∈ G which strengthens p and there are sets
dπ,r ⊆ Dπ,r for each 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ such that each dπ,r ∈M is predense below q. Using Collection in
M, there is a set x ∈M such that for each 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ and for each s ∈ dπ,r that is compatible with
r there is µ ∈ x such that s P ϕ(π, µ,Γ). Now put
τ = {〈µ, s〉 | µ ∈ x ∧ ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ σ (s ∈ dπ,r ∧ s P ϕ(π, µ,Γ))}.
By construction, M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σG ∃y ∈ τG ϕ(x, y,ΓG).
Next we turn to Separation. Let σ ∈MP,Γ ∈ CP and ϕ an L∈-formula with one class parameter.
We need to find a set name for {x ∈ σG | ϕ(x,ΓG)}. For each 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ let
Dπ,r = {q ≤P r | q P ϕ(π,Γ)} ∈ C.
By pretameness we can take p ∈ G and a sequence 〈dπ,r | 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ〉 ∈ M such that each
dπ,r ⊆ Dπ,r is predense below p. Then
τ = {〈π, q〉 | ∃r (〈π, r〉 ∈ σ ∧ q ∈ dπ,r ∧ q P ϕ(π,Γ))}
names the set {x ∈ σG | ϕ(x,ΓG)}.
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The class axioms of extensionality and foundation are trivial consequences of elements of C[G]
being subsets ofM [G], and of C being an element of V |= ZFC. To see thatM[G] satisfies first-order
class comprehension, note that
Γ = {〈σ, p〉 | p P ϕ(σ,Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1)} ∈ C
P
is a class name for the class {x | ϕ(x,ΓG0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1)}.
If ≺ is a set-like well-order of M in C then
x ⊳ y ⇐⇒ ∃σ ∈MP[x = σG ∧ ∀τ ∈MP(y = τG → σ ≺ τ)]
defines a set-like well-order of M [G] in C[G]. Finally, if 〈Cα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 is a hierarchy for M, we
can define a hierarchy 〈Dα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 in C[G] by
Dα = {x ∈M[G] | ∃σ ∈M
P ∩ Cα σ
G = x} = {〈σ,1〉 | σ ∈ Cα}
G ∈M [G]
for every α ∈ OrdM .
Now we turn to (2). Suppose that 〈Cα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 witnesses that M has a hierarchy. Assume,
towards a contradiction, that 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 is a sequence of dense classes and p is a condition in P
which witness that pretameness fails. By our assumption there is a P-generic filter G containing
p such that M[G] satisfies either Replacement or Collection. Now consider the function
F : I → OrdM , F (i) = min{α ∈ OrdM | G ∩Di ∩ Cα 6= ∅}.
By assumption, there is a set x ∈ M [G] with ran(F ) ⊆ x. Let γ be the supremum of all ordinals
in x and let
D = {q ≤P p | ∃i ∈ I ∀r ∈ Di ∩ Cγ (q⊥Pr)}.
By assumption, D is dense below p. Pick q ∈ G∩D and let i ∈ I such that q is incompatible with
all elements of Di ∩ Cγ . But then F (i) > γ, a contradiction. 
Our next result provides a partial answer to [HKL+16, Question 10.1], that is, over countable
transitive models of GBC−, we show that Separation implies Collection, and hence also Replace-
ment, in generic extensions for notions of class forcing that satisfy the forcing theorem. This will
be an easy consequence of the following.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. Let P ∈ C be a
notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem, and let G be P-generic over M. Suppose
that C[G] contains a cofinal function F : λ → OrdM , for some λ ∈ OrdM . Then Separation fails
in M[G].
Proof. Choose a set-like wellorder ≺∈ C of M . We pick a class name F˙ ∈ CP and r ∈ G such that
F˙G = F , and such that
r P F˙ : κˇ→ Ord
M is cofinal.
As r plays no role in the proof to come, we may assume that r = 1P. Let C ⊆ Ord
M × OrdM be
an element of C such that each Cγ = {δ ∈ Ord
M | 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ C} for γ ∈ OrdM is either of the form
Ap,α = {β ∈ Ord
M | ∃q ≤P p [q P F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ]} ∈ C
for p ∈ P and α ∈ OrdM such that Ap,α is a proper class of M, or of the form
Bp,α,τ = {β ∈ Ord
M | ∃q ≤P p [q P (F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ ∧ αˇ ∈ τ)]} ∈ C
for p ∈ P, α ∈ OrdM and τ ∈MP such that Bp,α,τ is a proper class of M, and moreover each such
Ap,α and Bp,α,τ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration 〈Cγ | γ ∈ Ord
M 〉.
Claim. There is D ∈ C such that both Cγ∩D and Cγ \D are proper classes of M for all γ ∈ Ord
M .
Proof. This can be achieved by recursively defining Dγ and D
′
γ inM as follows. Let D0 = D
′
0 = ∅.
Suppose that Dγ and D
′
γ have already been defined. Let Dγ+1 ∈M be the set obtained from Dγ
by adding the ≺-least x ∈ Cγ \ (Dγ ∪D
′
γ). Let D
′
γ+1 ∈M be the set obtained from D
′
γ by adding
the ≺-least x ∈ Cγ \ (Dγ+1 ∪D′γ). If γ is a limit ordinal, let Dγ =
⋃
δ<γ Dδ and D
′
γ =
⋃
δ<γ D
′
δ.
Let D =
⋃
γ∈OrdM Dγ ∈ C. Since each Cγ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration, both
Cγ ∩D and Cγ \D are proper classes. 
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Suppose that D ∈ C is as provided by the claim. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, to show
that Separation fails in M[G], it suffices to find Γ ∈ CP such that ΓG ∈ E is a subset of some
s ∈ M [G] and such that there is no p ∈ G and no τ ∈ MP with p P Γ = τ . Let Γ ∈ C be
a name for {α < κ | F (α) ∈ D}, which is an element of E , as the latter is closed under first
order definability. The above set s will be equal to κ. Suppose for a contradiction that p ∈ G
is such that p P Γ = τ for some τ ∈ MP. We first claim that there is an α < κ such that
Ap,α is a proper class. Assume that such an α does not exist. Then p forces that the range
of F˙ is bounded in OrdM , contradicting our assumption on F˙ . The above claim implies that
Ap,α ∩D = {β | ∃q ≤P p [q P (F˙ (αˇ) = βˇ ∧ αˇ ∈ τ)]} = Bp,α,τ is a proper class. Then Bp,α,τ \D
is empty, contradicting the choice of D. 
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. Let P ∈ C be
a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem, and let G be P-generic over M. If
M[G] satisfies Separation, then M[G] satisfies Collection, and hence also Replacement.
Proof. Assume that Collection fails in M[G]. By Theorem 3.1, (1), this implies that P is not
pretame. We want to show that Separation fails in M[G]. Using Lemma 2.6 together with the
axiom of choice (which is a consequence of the existence of a set-like wellorder), we can pick
λ ∈ OrdM and a class F ∈ C[G] that is a cofinal function from λ to OrdM . The statement of the
theorem now follows directly from Lemma 3.2 
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−, and let P be
a notion of class forcing for M. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) P is pretame.
(2) P preserves GB−.
(3) P preserves Collection.
(4) P preserves Replacement.
(5) P preserves Separation and satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. The equivalence of (1)–(4) follows from Theorem 3.1. The implication from (1) to (5)
follows from Theorem 2.4 together with Theorem 3.1. The implication from (5) to (3) is provided
by Theorem 3.3. 
4. Boolean completions
As has been shown in [HKL+16], the existence of Boolean completions is closely related to
the forcing theorem. Namely by [HKL+16, Theorem 5.5], if M is a countable transitive model of
GB−with a hierarchy, and P is a separative notion of class forcing for M, then P has a Boolean
M -completion if and only if it satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. Thus the following
is a consequence of Theorem 2.10.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GBC− such that C does not
contain a first-order truth predicate for M . Then a notion of class forcing P for M is pretame
over M if and only if it densely has a Boolean M -completion. 
Lemma 4.2. Let M be a countable transitive model of GB−. If a notion of class forcing P for
M has a Boolean C-completion B, then it is unique. Moreover, if P has a unique Boolean M -
completion B, then B is a Boolean C-completion of P.
Proof. The proof of the first statement is exactly as for set forcing. Suppose now that B is the
unique Boolean M -completion of P and suppose for a contradiction that A ⊆ B is a class in C
which does not have a supremum in B. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding
supA. Then since P satisfies the forcing theorem, by Lemma 1.10 so does Q and hence Q has
a Boolean M -completion B′. But by our assumption, B and B′ are isomorphic and hence supA
exists in B, a contradiction. 
Definition 4.3. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB−. If A,B ⊆ P
with A,B ∈ C, we say that supPA = supPB if
(1) A is predense below every b ∈ B and
(2) B is predense below every a ∈ A.
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Note that this definition is possible even if the suprema do not exist in P. On the other hand, if
supA = supB and A has a supremum in P then so does B and indeed they coincide.
The following observation is a slight strengthening of a lemma which is essentially due to Joel
Hamkins and appears within the proof of [HKL+16, Theorem 9.4]. The below proof is very
similar to the one appearing in [HKL+16, Theorem 9.4], however we also improved our original
presentation.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GBC−. If P does not satisfy the
Ord-cc, then there is an antichain A ∈ C such that for every B ∈M with B ⊆ P, supB 6= supA.
In particular, A does not have a supremum in P.
Proof. Let A ∈ C be a class-sized antichain in P. We claim that there is a subclass of A in C which
fulfills the desired properties. Suppose for a contradiction that no such subclass exists. Using the
set-like well-order of M , we can assume that the domain of P is OrdM . Let π : OrdM → A be a
bijection in C. Furthermore, there is an injection ϕ : P(OrdM ) ∩M → OrdM in C. This gives us
a mapping i : P(OrdM ) ∩ C → OrdM in V which maps X ⊆ OrdM to ϕ(B), where B is the least
(with respect to our given global well-order) set B ⊆ P in M such that supP π
′′X = supPB. Since
A is an antichain, i is injective. Moreover, whether i(X) = α is definable over M, so
C = {α ∈ OrdM | π(α) P α ∧ i(Xα) = α}
is in C for Xα = {β ∈ Ord
M | π(β) ≤P α}.
Claim 1. For each α ∈ OrdM we have α ∈ C if and only if there is X ∈ P(OrdM ) ∩ C such that
i(X) = α and α /∈ X.
Proof. Suppose first that α ∈ C. Then α /∈ Xα and so we can choose X = Xα. Conversely,
suppose that X ∈ P(OrdM ) ∩ C is such that i(X) = α and α /∈ X . Then X = Xα, because π′′X
and π′′Xα are both subsets of the antichain A and have the same supremum. Hence α ∈ C. 
We will use Claim 1 to derive a contradiction similar to Russell’s paradox. Consider β = i(C).
If β ∈ C then by Claim 1 there is X such that i(X) = β but β /∈ X . By injectivity of i, this
means that X = C, a contradiction. On the other hand, it is also impossible that β /∈ C, since
otherwise X = C would witness that β ∈ C. 
The following theorem characterizes the Ord-cc in terms of the existence of Boolean completions.
Note that the equivalence of (1) and (2) is exactly the statement of [HKL+16, Theorem 9.4]. For
the benefit of the reader, we nevertheless give a full proof.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. Then the
following statements are equivalent for every separative partial order P:
(1) P satisfies the Ord-cc.
(2) P has a unique Boolean M -completion.
(3) P has a Boolean C-completion.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc. Then P is pretame and hence it has a Boolean
M -completion B by Theorem 4.1. Assume that B′ is another BooleanM -completion. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that the domain of P is a subset of the domains of B and B′. Then
we can define an isomorphism between B and B′ by mapping b ∈ B to supB′ A, where A ∈M is a
maximal antichain in {p ∈ P | p ≤B b}. The equivalence of (2) and (3) is a direct consequence of
Lemma 4.2. To see that (3) implies (1), suppose that B is a Boolean C-completion of P. Assume,
towards a contradiction, that P does not satisfy the Ord-cc. Then neither does B. But then by
Lemma 4.4, B cannot be C-complete. 
5. The extension maximality principle
This section is motivated by the following easy observation which is mentioned in [HKL+16,
Corollary 2.3]. The collapse forcing Col∗(ω,Ord)
M , which consists of functions n → OrdM for
n ∈ ω, ordered by reverse inclusion, is dense in Col(ω,Ord)M . However, unlike Col(ω,Ord)M ,
which collapses all M -cardinals, Col∗(ω,Ord)
M does not add any new sets, so Col(ω,Ord)M and
Col∗(ω,Ord)
M do not have the same generic extensions. We will show that, under sufficient
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conditions on the ground model M, the property of P of having the same generic extensions as
all forcing notions into which P densely embeds is in fact equivalent to the pretameness of P. Let
M = 〈M, C〉 be countable transitive model of GB−.
Definition 5.1. A notion of class forcing P for M satisfies the
(1) extension maximality principle (EMP) over M if whenever Q is a notion of class forcing
for M and π : P → Q is a dense embedding in C then for every Q-generic filter G over M,
M [G] =M [π−1[G]].
(2) strong extension maximality principle (SEMP) over M if whenever Q is a notion of class
forcing for M, π : P→ Q is a dense embedding in C and σ ∈MQ, then there is τ ∈MP with
1Q Q σ = π(τ).
Definition 5.2. Given a notion of class forcing P and a P-name σ, we define the conditions
appearing in (the transitive closure of) σ by induction on name rank as
tc(σ) =
⋃
{{p} ∪ tc(τ) | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
Theorem 5.3. LetM = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GBC−. A notion of class forcing
P for M is pretame if and only if it satisfies the forcing theorem and the EMP.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. By Theorem 2.4, P satisfies the forcing theorem. Let Q
be a notion of class forcing such that P embeds densely into Q and let G be Q-generic over M.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a dense suborder of Q. Fix a Q-name σ. We
claim that σG ∈ M [G ∩ P]. For every q ∈ tc(σ) ∩ Q, let Dq = {p ∈ P | p ≤Q q ∨ p⊥Qq}. Then
Dq is a dense subclass of P. By pretameness, there is p ∈ G ∩ P and there are dq ⊆ Dq which are
predense below p in P. Now we define inductively, for every name τ in tc({σ}) ∩MQ,
τ¯ = {〈µ¯, r〉 | ∃s[〈µ, s〉 ∈ τ ∧ r ∈ ds ∧ r ≤Q s]}.
But then σ¯ ∈MP and σG = σ¯G∩P ∈M [G ∩ P].
Conversely, assume that P is not pretame but satisfies the forcing theorem. Then there is a
P-generic filter G such that Replacement fails in the generic extension M[G], and by Theorem
3.3, so does Separation (note that this is where we use the existence of a set-like well-order).
Hence there is a set x ∈ M [G] and a first-order formula ϕ with a class parameter C such that
{y ∈ x | ϕ(y, C)} /∈ M [G]. By Observation 1.4, C has a class name Γ ∈ CP. Using the truth
lemma, we can find p ∈ G such that p P Γ ⊆ σ, where x = σG. By assumption, there are no
q ∈ G and τ ∈MP such that q P Γ = τ . For µ ∈ dom(σ) consider
Aµ = {q ∈ P | q P µ ∈ Γ}.
Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding supAµ for each µ ∈ dom(σ) such that Aµ
is nonempty below p, as described in Section 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
P is a subset of Q and then P is actually a dense subset of Q. Consider the Q-name
τ = {〈µ, supAµ〉 | µ ∈ dom(σ), Aµ is nonempty below p} ∈M
Q.
Let H be the Q-generic induced by G, that is the upwards closure of G in Q. Then τ is a Q-name
for ΓG, so τH = ΓG ∈M [H ] \M [G], yielding the failure of the EMP. 
Note that in the proof of Theorem 5.3 we have only used the set-like well-order of M to show
that every forcing notion which satisfies the forcing theorem and the EMP is pretame; for the
other direction, it suffices to assume that M |= GB− has a hierarchy.
Example 5.4. Jensen coding P (see [BJW82]) is a pretame notion of class forcing which over
a model M of ZFC adds a generic real x such that the P-generic extension is of the form L[x].
Moreover, there is a class name Γ for x such that 1P P M [G˙] = L[Γ], but there is no set name σ
such that 1P P σ = Γ. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from Jensen coding by adding the
suprema pn = sup{p ∈ P | p P nˇ ∈ Γ}. Since P is pretame and dense in Q, it follows that Q is
also pretame. By Theorem 5.3, P satisfies the EMP and hence P and Q produce the same generic
extensions. In particular, this means that if G is Q-generic then M [G∩P] =M [G] = L[σG], where
σ = {〈nˇ, pn〉 | n ∈ ω} ∈MQ.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. Then a notion
of class forcing P for M satisfies the SEMP if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
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Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc. Suppose that there is a dense embedding from P
into some forcing notion Q. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a suborder of Q.
We prove by induction on rank(σ) that for every σ ∈ MQ there is σ¯ ∈ MP with 1Q Q σ = σ¯.
Assume that this holds for all τ of rank less than rank(σ). Then for every τ ∈ dom(σ) there
is τ¯ ∈ MP with 1Q Q τ = τ¯ . For each condition q ∈ range(σ), let Dq = {p ∈ P | p ≤Q q}
and choose an antichain Aq which is maximal in Dq. By assumption, we may do this so that
〈〈q, Aq〉 | q ∈ range(σ)〉 ∈M . Then put
σ¯ = {〈τ¯ , p〉 | ∃q ∈ Q [〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ p ∈ Aq]} ∈M
P.
By construction, 1Q Q σ = σ¯.
Conversely, suppose that P does not satisfy the Ord-cc. Then by Lemma 4.4 there is an
antichain A ∈ C such that for no B ∈ M with B ⊆ P, supPA = supPB. Let Q = P ∪ {supA} be
the extension of P given by adding the supremum of A. Now consider σ = {〈0ˇ, supA〉} ∈MQ. We
claim that σ witnesses the failure of the SEMP. Suppose for a contradiction that there is τ ∈MP
such that 1Q Q σ = τ . Let τ = {〈µi, pi〉 | i ∈ I} for some I ∈ M . But then it is easy to check
that supP{pi | i ∈ I} = supPA, contradicting our assumption on A. 
6. Nice Names
This section is motivated by the observation in Lemma 6.2 below, namely that - unlike in the
context of set forcing - there are sets of ordinals in class-generic extensions which do not have a
nice name. We will characterize both pretameness and the Ord-cc in terms of the existence of nice
names for sets of ordinals. We assume that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GB−.
Definition 6.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing. A name σ ∈MP for a set of ordinals is a nice
name if it is of the form
⋃
α<γ{αˇ} × Aα for some γ ∈ Ord
M , where each Aα ∈ M is a set-sized
antichain of conditions in P.
Lemma 6.2. Let P denote Col(ω,Ord)M . Then in every P-generic extension there is a subset of
ω which does not have a nice P-name.
Proof. Consider the canonical name σ = {〈nˇ, {〈n, 0〉}〉 | n ∈ ω} for the set of natural numbers
which are mapped to 0 by the generic function from ω to the ordinals. Let G be P-generic over
M. We show that the complement of σG is an element of M [G], but does not have a nice P-name
in M . Suppose for a contradiction that there are p ∈ G and a nice P-name
τ =
⋃
n∈ω
{nˇ} ×An ∈M,
where each An ∈ M is an antichain, such that p P ωˇ \ σ = τ . Let n ∈ ω \ dom(p) and choose
α > sup{r(i) | r ∈ An ∧ i ∈ dom(r)}. Then q = p ∪ {〈n, α〉} strengthens p and q P nˇ ∈ τ . Hence
there must be some r ∈ An which is compatible with q. But then n /∈ dom(r), so p and r∪{〈n, 0〉}
are compatible. Let s ≤P p, r ∪ {〈n, 0〉} witness this. Then s P nˇ ∈ σ ∩ τ , a contradiction.
It remains to show that the complement of σG has a P-name in M , and is thus an element of
M [G]. For each n ∈ ω, consider the P-name
τn = nˇ ∪ {〈mˇ, {〈i, 0〉 | n ≤ i < m}〉 | m > n}.
Then each τn is a name for the least k ≥ n such that k /∈ σG. Now put τ = {〈τn,1P〉 | n ∈ ω}.
Since by an easy density argument the complement of σG is unbounded in ω, τ is as desired. 
Definition 6.3. A notion of class forcing P for M is said to be
(1) nice if for every γ ∈ OrdM , for every σ ∈ MP and for every P-generic filter G such that
σG ⊆ γ there is a nice name τ ∈MP such that σG = τG.
(2) very nice if for every γ ∈ OrdM and for every σ ∈MP such that 1P P σ ⊆ γˇ there is a nice
name τ ∈MP such that 1P P σ = τ .
Example 6.4. (1) By Lemma 6.2, Col(ω,Ord)M is not nice.
(2) Suppose M satisfies the axiom of choice. Then every pretame notion of class forcing P for
M is nice. To see this, let γ ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and let p ∈ P and σ ∈ MP be such that
p P σ ⊆ γˇ. For each α < γ, consider the class
Dα = {q ≤P p | q P α ∈ σ ∨ q P α /∈ σ} ∈ C,
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which is dense below p. By pretameness there exist q ≤P p and a sequence 〈dα | α < γ〉 ∈M
such that for every α < γ, dα ⊆ Dα is predense below q. For each α < γ, choose an antichain
aα ⊆ dα which is maximal in dα, and let Aα = {r ∈ aα | r P αˇ ∈ σ}. Then
τ =
⋃
α<γ
{αˇ} ×Aα ∈M
P
is a nice name for a subset of γ and q P σ = τ .
(3) If M |= GBC−, then every notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the Ord-cc is very
nice: Suppose that 1P P σ ⊆ γˇ. For every α < γ, we can choose an antichain Aα which is
maximal in {q ∈ P | ∃〈µ, p〉 ∈ σ [q ≤P p ∧ q P µ = αˇ]}. Since P satisfies the Ord-cc, making
use of the global well-order we can do this so that 〈〈α,Aα〉 | α < γ〉 ∈M . Then
τ =
⋃
α<γ
{αˇ} ×Aα ∈M
P
is a nice name and it is easy to check that 1P P σ = τ .
(4) Suppose that M has a hierarchy. Then every M -complete Boolean algebra B is very nice,
since we can always define Boolean values JϕKB for quantifier-free infinitary formulae ϕ which
mention only set names (see [HKL+16, Theorem 5.5]). More precisely, if σ ∈MB such that
1B B σ ⊆ γˇ for some ordinal γ, the name
τ = {〈αˇ, Jαˇ ∈ σKB〉 | α < γ} ∈M
B
is a nice name so that 1B B σ = τ . In particular, this shows that there are very nice
notions of class forcing which are not pretame (for example the Boolean M -completion of
Col(ω,Ord)M ), since every notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem
has a Boolean M -completion by [HKL+16, Theorem 5.5].
We will need the following.
Lemma 6.5. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. Let α ∈ OrdM be an ordinal and let
σ, τ ∈ MP be nice names for subsets of α. If G is P-generic over M, then there is a P-name
µ ∈MP such that µG = σG ∩ τG.
Proof. Since σ and τ are nice names, they are of the form
σ =
⋃
β<α
{βˇ} ×Xβ and τ =
⋃
β<α
{βˇ} × Yβ ,
where 〈Xβ | β < α〉, 〈Yβ | β < α〉 ∈ M . Let G be P-generic over M and let β0 ∈ α be
minimal such that β0 ∈ σG ∩ τG. Put µ = {〈βˇ0,1P〉} ∪ {〈µβ , p〉 | β ∈ (β0, α), p ∈ Xβ}, where
µβ = βˇ0 ∪
⋃
γ<β{γˇ} × Yβ for every β ∈ (β0, α). Then
(µβ)
G =
{
β, β ∈ τG
β0, otherwise.
Clearly, µG = σG ∩ τG is as desired. 
Theorem 6.6. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of KM. Then a notion of class
forcing P for M is pretame if and only if it is densely nice.
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. It is straightforward to check that whenever there is a
dense embedding π : P→ Q in C for some notion of class forcing Q for M, then Q is also pretame.
Then by Example 6.4 (2), every such Q is nice.
Conversely, suppose that P is not pretame. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem overM (because
every notion of class forcing does so over a model of KM – see either [Ant15, Lemma 15] or
[HKL+16, Corollary 5.8]), we may, without loss of generality, assume that P = 〈P,≤P〉 is an M -
complete Boolean algebra, and we may also assume that P = OrdM . We will extend P to a notion
of class forcing Q for M which is not nice and so that P is a dense subforcing of Q. By Lemma
2.6 there are a class name F˙ ∈ CP, κ ∈ Ord and p ∈ P such that p P “ F˙ : κˇ→ Ord is cofinal”.
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that p = 1P.
For every α, β < κ and p ∈ P, let
Xp,α,β = {〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Ord
M ×OrdM | ∃q ≤P p [q P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = δˇ]},
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and let
Yp,α = {γ ∈ Ord
M | ∃q ≤P p [q P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ]}.
Claim 1. For each p ∈ P there is α < κ such that for all β < κ, Xp,α,β is a proper class.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then for every α < κ there exists βα < κ such that Xp,α,βα is
set-sized. In particular, this implies that for every α < κ, {γ ∈ OrdM | ∃q ≤P p [q P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ]}
is set-sized. But then p forces that the range of F˙ is bounded in the ordinals, a contradiction. 
Let C = 〈Ci | i ∈ Ord
M 〉 ∈ C be an enumeration of subclasses of OrdM × OrdM such that
each Ci is of the form Xp,α,β for some p ∈ P and α, β < κ such that Xp,α,β is a proper class, and
moreover each Xp,α,β which is a proper class appears unboundedly often in the enumeration C.
We will next perform a recursive construction to build two classes D,E ∈ C, in a way that in
particular each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \D has a proper class sized intersection with Yp,α = {γ |
〈γ, γ〉 ∈ Xp,α,α} whenever Yp,α is a proper class. The construction of the classes D,E will satisfy
further properties which will be used in the proof of Claim 2 below.
Let D0 = D
′
0 = E0 = E
′
0 = ∅. Suppose that Di, D
′
i, Ei, E
′
i have already been defined such that
Di ∩D′i = Ei ∩E
′
i = D
′
i ∩E
′
i = ∅ and Di ∪D
′
i = Ei ∪E
′
i. We define Fi = Di ∪D
′
i = Ei ∪E
′
i. Let
〈γ0, δ0〉, 〈γ1, δ1〉, 〈γ2, δ2〉 be the lexicographically least pairs of ordinals in Ci such that each pair
〈γk, δk〉 contains at least one ordinal not in Fi ∪{γj | j < k}∪ {δj | j < k}, and γ0, δ0 additionally
satisfy (if possible)
γ0 /∈ Fi ∧ δ0 /∈ D
′
i,(1)
and γ1, δ1 satisfy in addition (if such exist)
γ1 /∈ Fi ∪ {γ0, δ0} ∧ δ1 /∈ E
′
i.(2)
In the successor step, we will enlargeDi, D
′
i, Ei and E
′
i to Di+1, D
′
i+1, Ei+1 and E
′
i+1 by putting
distinct ordinals, which are not in Fi, into the sets Di+1 ∩ Ei+1, Di+1 ∩ E′i+1 and D
′
i+1 ∩ Ei+1.
First, we put each ordinal in {γ0, δ0} which is not in Fi into Di+1∩E′i+1. Next, we put all ordinals
amongst {γ1, δ1} that are not in Fi ∪ {γ0, δ0} into D
′
i+1 ∩ Ei+1. Finally, we put every ordinal in
{γ2, δ2} which is not yet in Fi ∪ {γ0, γ1, δ0, δ1} into Di+1 ∩ Ei+1. Note that by construction,
Di+1 ∩D′i+1 = Ei+1 ∩ E
′
i+1 = D
′
i+1 ∩E
′
i+1 = ∅ and Di+1 ∪D
′
i+1 = Ei+1 ∪ E
′
i+1.
At limit stages, we take unions, e.g. if j is a limit ordinal, we let Dj =
⋃
i<j Di. Finally, let
D =
⋃
i∈OrdM Di ∈ C and let E =
⋃
i∈OrdM Ei ∈ C.
Note that at each stage i such that Ci = Xp,α,α for some p ∈ P and α ∈ Ord
M , each of the
classes D∩E, D \E and E \D obtains a new element from Yp,α. Since there are class many such
stages, each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \D has a proper class-sized intersection with Yp,α whenever
Yp,α is a proper class.
Let a = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P [p P F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Dˇ]} and let b = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P [p P F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Eˇ]}. We
extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema for each of the classes
Rα = {p ∈ P | p P F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Dˇ} and
Sβ = {p ∈ P | p P F˙ (βˇ) ∈ Eˇ}
for α ∈ a and β ∈ b, as described in Section 1. Let pα = supQRα and let qβ = supQ Sβ for α ∈ a
resp. β ∈ b. Since M is a model of KM, Q satisfies the forcing theorem.
We will show that Q is not nice. Let G˙ denote the canonical class name for the Q-generic filter.
Consider the Q-names
σ = {〈αˇ, pα〉 | α ∈ a} and τ = {〈αˇ, qα〉 | α ∈ b}
for {α < κ | F˙ G˙(α) ∈ Dˇ} and {α < κ | F˙ G˙(α) ∈ Eˇ} respectively. By Lemma 6.5, for every
Q-generic filter G there is a Q-name µ such that µG = σG ∩ τG. We claim that MQ contains no
nice name for σG∩ τG. Suppose for a contradiction that there are p ∈ Q and a nice name ν ∈MQ
such that p Q ν = σ ∩ τ . By density of P in Q, we may assume that p ∈ P. Since ν is a nice
name, it is of the form
ν =
⋃
α<κ
{αˇ} ×Aα,
where each Aα ⊆ Q is a set-sized antichain in M .
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Let α < κ be as in Claim 1. We may assume that Aα only contains conditions which are
compatible with p.
Claim 2. For every q ∈ Aα,
Zq = {γ ∈ Ord
M | ∃r ∈ P [r ≤Q p, q and r P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ]}
is a set in M .
Proof. We first consider q ∈ Aα ∩ P. By assumption p and q are compatible, and since P is a
Boolean algebra, Zq = Yp∧q,α. Assume for a contradiction that Yp∧q,α is a proper class. Then by
our construction, Yp∧q,α \D is a proper class as well. Take γ ∈ Yp∧q,α \ D and r ≤P p ∧ q with
r P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Let G be Q-generic with r ∈ G. Then p, q ∈ G and so α ∈ νG = σG ∩ τG. On the
other hand, since F˙G(α) = γ /∈ D, we have pα /∈ G and hence α /∈ σG. This is a contradiction.
Next, suppose that q = pα and assume for a contradiction that Zpα is a proper class. Then
Yp,α is a proper class, so Yp,α ∩ (D \ E) is also a proper class. Now let r ≤P p and γ ∈ D \ E be
such that r P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ. Then r ≤Q pα by the definition of pα. If G is Q-generic with r ∈ G,
then α ∈ νG. Since γ /∈ E, we have α /∈ τG. This is a contradiction.
Next, suppose that q = pβ ∈ Aα for some β 6= α. If there is some 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β such that
δ ∈ D but γ /∈ D∩E, then take r ≤P p such that r P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ ∧ F˙ (βˇ) = δˇ and a Q-generic filter
containig r. Since δ ∈ D we have pβ ∈ G and so α ∈ νG. On the other hand, F˙G(α) = γ /∈ D∩E,
so α /∈ σG ∩ τG. So there can be no such 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β . Hence for all 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β, if δ ∈ D
then γ ∈ D ∩ E. Suppose for a contradiction that Zpβ is a proper class. Consider now the first
stage i such that Xp,α,β = Ci. Since Yp,α is a proper class, there is 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β such that
γ /∈ Fi. If there is such a pair which additionally satisfies that δ /∈ D′i, then we are in case (1)
in the recursive construction of D and E and so this would imply that γ ends up in D \ E and
δ ∈ D. But we have already shown that this is impossible. So for every pair 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β with
γ /∈ Fi we have δ ∈ D′i. In particular, if δ ∈ D then γ ∈ Fi. This implies that Zpβ ⊆ Fi: Let
γ ∈ Zp,β. Then there is δ ∈ Ord
M such that 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β. By the definition of pβ we have
β ∈ D and hence by our previous argument γ ∈ Fi. But then Zpβ is not a proper class, which is
a contradiction.
The case q = qα is analogous to the case q = pα. Finally, suppose that q = qβ for some
β 6= α. As in the previous case q = pβ, we can conclude that for all 〈γ, δ〉 ∈ Xp,α,β , if δ ∈ E then
γ ∈ D ∩ E. As above, we assume that Zqβ is not in M and we let i be the least ordinal such
that Ci = Xp,α,β. After choosing γ0, δ0 in the recursive construction of D and E, there is still a
pair 〈γ1, δ1〉 such that γ1 /∈ F
+
i = Fi ∪ {γ0, δ0}, since Yp,α is a proper class. If possible, this pair
is chosen such that δ1 /∈ E′i. But then γ1 is put into E \ D and δ1 ends up in E. However, we
have already argued that this cannot occur. But then for every such pair 〈γ1, δ1〉 ∈ Xp,α,β with
γ1 /∈ F
+
i , we have δ1 ∈ E
′
i, and so Zqβ is contained in the set F
+
i , which is a contradiction. 
By Claim 2 and since Aα ∈M , we have that
B =
⋃
q∈Aα
Zq ∈M.
Since Yp,α is a proper class, so is Yp,α ∩D∩E by our construction, and hence there must be some
γ ∈ (Yp,α ∩ D ∩ E) \ B. Let now q ≤P p such that q P F˙ (αˇ) = γˇ and take a Q-generic filter G
with q ∈ G. Then F˙G(α) = γ ∈ D ∩ E, so α ∈ σG ∩ τG. Therefore there is some r ∈ Aα ∩ G.
Take s ∈ G with s ≤Q q, r. Then s Q γˇ = F˙ (αˇ) ∈ Bˇ, contradicting the choice of γ. 
Theorem 6.7. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. A notion of
class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem satisfies the Ord-cc if and only if it is
densely very nice.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc and P embeds densely into Q. It is easy to see
that then Q also satisfies the Ord-cc and so by Example 6.4, (3) it is very nice.
Conversely, suppose that P contains a class-sized antichain. We would like to extend P via a
dense embedding to a partial order which is not very nice. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem,
P has a Boolean M -completion. As we are only interested in a dense property, we may therefore
assume that P is already an M -complete Boolean algebra.
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By the proof of Lemma 4.4, we can find three disjoint subclasses of our given class-sized an-
tichain, each of which contains a subclass which does not have a supremum in P. Denote these
subclasses without suprema by A,D and E, and let B = A ∪D and C = A ∪ E.
Claim 1. At least one of supB and supC does not exist in P.
Proof. We show that if both supB and supC exist, then so does supA, contradicting our choice
of A. Since P is an M -complete Boolean algebra, if supB and supC exist, then so does p =
supB ∧ supC. We claim that p is already the supremum of A. It is clear that every element of A
is below p. It remains to check that A is predense below p. Let q ≤P p. Since B is predense below
q, there are r ≤P q and b ∈ B with r ≤P b. Since C is predense below r, there are s ≤P r and
c ∈ C with s ≤P c. In particular, b and c are compatible. But they both belong to the antichain
B ∪C, so b = c ∈ B ∩C = A. 
Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding supB and supC. By Lemma 1.10, Q
satisfies the forcing theorem. Moreover, it follows from the separativity of P that Q is separative.
We show that Q is not very nice. Consider the Q-name
σ = {〈{〈0ˇ, supB〉}, supC〉}.
By definition, 1Q Q σ ⊆ 2ˇ.
Claim 2. There is no nice Q-name τ such that 1Q Q σ = τ .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that τ = {0ˇ}×A0∪{1ˇ}×A1, where A0, A1 ∈M are antichains
of Q, and 1Q Q σ = τ . Observe that A1 ⊆ P, since if for example supB ∈ A1 and G is Q-generic
with supB ∈ G and supC /∈ G, then 1 ∈ τG \ σG. The same works for supC. Therefore supA1
exists in P. We claim that supA1 is the supremum of A.
Firstly, we show that every element of A is below supA1. Suppose for a contradiction that
there is a ∈ A with a Q supA1. Then by separativity of Q there is p ≤P a with p⊥P supA1.
In particular, p is incompatible with every element of A1. Hence if G is a Q-generic filter with
p ∈ G then 1 ∈ σG \ τG, contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ . Secondly, we check that A is
predense below supA1. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is p ≤P supA1 with p⊥Pa for
each a ∈ A. Now A1 is predense below p, so there exist q ≤P p and r ∈ A1 with q ≤P r. Again,
this yields that for any Q-generic filter G with q ∈ G, 1 ∈ τG but A ∩ G = ∅, so it is impossible
that supB and supC are both in G. Hence 1 /∈ σG, contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ .
We have thus shown that supA exists in P, contradicting our choice of A. 
This proves that Q is not very nice. 
The proof of Theorem 6.7 actually shows that every notion of forcing P which satisfies the
forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc, can be densely embedded into a notion of class forcing which
satisfies the forcing theorem and is nice but not very nice. To see this, it remains to check that
the partial order Q constructed above is nice. This follows from the following more general result:
Lemma 6.8. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem. If P
is nice and Q is obtained from P by adding the supremum of some subclass A ∈ C of P, then Q is
also nice.
Proof. Let σ ∈ MQ and p Q σ ⊆ γˇ for some p ∈ Q and γ ∈ Ord
M . Let σ+ denote the P-name
obtained from σ by replacing every ocurrence of supA in tc(σ) by 1P, and let σ
− be defined
recursively by σ− = {〈τ−, p〉 ∈ σ | p 6= supA}. Let q ≤Q p. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that q ∈ P. If q is incompatible with every element of A, then q Q σ = σ−. But then
there are r ≤P q and a nice P-name τ such that r P σ− = τ and so r Q σ = τ . If there is some
a ∈ A such that q is compatible with a, let r ≤P q, a. Then r Q σ = σ
+ and so as in the previous
case we can strengthen r to some s which witnesses that σ+ has a nice P-name. 
Corollary 6.9. Suppose that M = 〈M, C〉 is a countable transitive model of GBC−. Every notion
of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc is dense in a notion of class
forcing which is nice but not very nice. 
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7. Open Questions
Assume that M is a countable transitive model of GB− and that P is a notion of class forcing
for M. By Corollary 3.4 and Theorem 2.4, if P preserves either Replacement or Collection, then
P satisfies the forcing theorem. By Theorem 3.3, if P preserves Separation and satisfies the
forcing theorem, then P preserves Collection, and hence also Replacement. It would thus be very
interesting to know the answer to the following question.
Question 7.1. Assume that M |= GBC and that P preserves Separation. Does this imply that P
satisfies the forcing theorem?
In Section 5, we proved that over models of GBC−, pretameness is equivalent to the EMP for
partial orders which satisfy the forcing theorem.
Question 7.2. Assume P is a notion of class forcing for M which does not satisfy the forcing
theorem. Does this imply that the EMP fails for P?
Most of our characterizations of pretameness use GBC− as a base theory.
Question 7.3. Is the assumption of a set-like wellorder of M necessary for these results? Can it
be replaced by the assumption of the existence of a hierarchy for some of them? Do any of these
characterizations work over the base theory GB−?
In order to prove Theorem 6.6, we work in KM, since our proof uses that the forcing theorem
is preserved when adding infinitely many suprema to a given notion of class forcing that satisfies
the forcing theorem. KM implies that every notion of class forcing satisfies the forcing theorem.
The following question arises.
Question 7.4. Can pretameness be characterized in terms of the existence of nice names for sets
of ordinals in GBC?
Every proof of the failure of the forcing theorem for first order definable notions of class forcing
that is known to the authors (see [HKL+16, Section 7] and Theorem 2.9 of the present paper)
uses the nonexistence of a first-order truth predicate in the ground model. This motivates the
following question.
Question 7.5. Assume M = 〈M, C〉 |= GB− such that C contains a first order truth predicate for
M . Does every notion of class forcing that is (first-order) definable over 〈M,∈〉 satisfy the forcing
theorem over M?
Let us emphasize that we ask for definable notions of class forcing in the above. Let F denote
the notion of class forcing provided in [HKL+16, Definition 2.4], for which the forcing relation is
not definable. It should be easy to define a version of F relative to a first order truth predicate
T , not only coding the ∈-relation of the ground model by a binary relation on ω, but also coding
the truth predicate T by a unary relation on ω. If the forcing theorem held for that version of F,
this would yield a truth predicate for the structure 〈M,∈, T 〉 inside of C, an assumption that is
strictly stronger than asking for the existence of a first order truth predicate in C. So if M is as in
the above question, then there is a notion of class forcing for M that does not satisfy the forcing
theorem, however it is not definable over 〈M,∈〉.
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